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Neder v. United States Materiality in Bank
Fraud Prosecutions
I. INTRODUCiON
In Neder v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal
bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344.2 A defendant charged with
violating the bank fraud statute must not only attempt to deceive
a financial institution, but the means used to deceive must be ca-
pable "of influencing the intended victim." 3 In so holding, the
Supreme Court relied on the common law meaning of "scheme
or artifice to defraud," a phrase used in the statute, to find that
Congress intended the statute to include the materiality element.
However, the Court's opinion fails to address the government's
policy concern that individuals who intentionally try to defraud
banks, but whose means of attempting the fraud are incapable of
influencing the bank's employees, will not be guilty of any crime.
As a result, these bad actors will go unpunished, and may again
attempt to defraud a financial institution, perhaps with a more
effective plan.
This Note begins by examining the basic facts of Neder, its
procedural history, and the relevant factors used in the Supreme
Court's decision that materiality is indeed an element of federal
bank fraud.4 The Note'then investigates the relevant background
law which influenced the Court's analysis. 5 The Note continues
1. 119 S.Ct. 1827 (1999).
2. See id. (holding that the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and wire
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, contained the materiality element). 18 U.S.C. § 1344
is a federal statute prohibiting any attempted scheme or artifice to defraud a feder-
ally insured financial institution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
3. Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1841.
4. See infra notes 8-43 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 44-78 and accompanying text.
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by reviewing Court's legal analysis, as well as the policy consid-
erations that surrounded the decision.6 Finally, the Note will
highlight the concerns for the nation's banking industry that re-
sult from the Court's decision in Neder.7
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant in Neder v. United States, Ellis E. Neder, Jr.,
worked in Jacksonville, Florida as an attorney and real estate de-
veloper.8 From 1984 to 1986, Neder financed several real estate
transactions by securing fraudulent bank loans.9 On one occa-
sion, Neder falsely claimed that he had pre-sold the twenty con-
dominiums necessary to satisfy a condition of a loan on which he
later defaulted.1 0 Neder later submitted a number of loan re-
quests based on false invoices, for which he received nearly three
million dollars." Neder was eventually indicted on twelve
counts of bank fraud in violation of section 1344, as well as nine
counts of mail fraud, nine counts of wire fraud, and two counts
6. See infra notes 79-134 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
8. See Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1831.
9. See id. at 1831-32. The Court described Neder's scheme by stating:
Using inflated appraisals, Neder secured bank loans that typically
amounted to 70 to 75% of the inflated resale price of the land. In so
doing, he concealed from lenders that he controlled the shell corpo-
rations, that he had purchased the land at prices substantially lower
than the inflated resale prices, and that the limited partnerships
had not made substantial down payments as represented. In sev-
eral cases, Neder agreed to sign affidavits falsely stating that he
had no relationship to the shell corporations and that he was not
sharing in the profits from the inflated land sales. By keeping for
himself the amount by which the loan proceeds exceeded the origi-
nal purchase price of the land, Neder was able to obtain more than
$7 million... He eventually defaulted on the loans.
Id.
10. See id. at 1832. The opinion does not include any specific detail concerning
how the facts would lead to a different outcome of the case if materiality was an
element the fraud statutes at issue. See id. However, on remand, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that the omission of the materiality element was harmless error. See
United States v. Neder, 197 F.3d 1122, 1123 (11th Cir. 1999). See infra note 43 and
accompanying text.
11. See Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1832.
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of filing a false income tax return.1 2 The fraud counts alleged that
Neder was involved in fraudulent schemes to obtain loans for
land acquisition and development that totaled over $ 40 million.'
3
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence at trial,
and over the defendant's objection, the jury was instructed that
materiality was "not a question for the jury to decide" on the is-
sue of bank fraud.14 Further, the district court judge, outside the
presence of the jury, concluded that the evidence established the
materiality element that may exist for any of the false statements
at issue.15 Neder was convicted by the jury on all counts.16 He
was ordered to pay $ 25 million in restitution and sentenced to
147 months imprisonment.'7
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court conviction,18 also concluding that materiality was not an
element of the bank fraud, wire fraud, or mail fraud statutes. 9
In reaching its decision, the court followed the precedent of other
Eleventh Circuit opinions which had omitted materiality as an
element in mail and wire fraud cases.20 It also drew a parallel
between the fraud statutes at issue, and 18 U.S.C. § 1014,21 stating
12. See id. Mail fraud violated 18 U.S.C. § 1341. See id. Wire fraud violated 18
U.S.C. § 1343. See id. Tax charges were in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (1). See id.
13. See id.
14. Id. A similar instruction was also given for the tax counts. See id. The
Court also failed to include materiality as an element when charging the jury on




18. See id. See also United States v. Neder, 136 F.3d 1459, 1462-63 (11th Cir.
1998).
19. See Neder, 136 F.3d at 1462-63.
20. See id. at 1461. See also United States v. Pitt, 717 F.2d 1334, 1339-40 (11th Cir.
1983) (excluding materiality as an element of wire fraud); United States v. Scott, 701
F.2d 1340,1343 (11th Cir. 1983) (listing the elements of mail fraud without including
materiality).
21.18 U.S.C. § 1014 is another federal statute aimed at protecting federally in-
sured banks from deceptive practices by customers. See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1994).
Section 1014 criminalized "knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or report.., for
the purpose of influencing in any way the action of... any institution the accounts
of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation... upon any
application, advancement, discount, purchase, purchase agreement, repurchase
agreement, commitment, or loan." Id.
2000] 657
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
that the statutes were similar in many respects.22 The court of
appeals concluded that an earlier Supreme Court holding that
materiality was not an element in § 1014 controlled the case at
hand.23
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict
in the Courts of Appeals" 24 by deciding "whether materiality is
an element of a 'scheme or artifice to defraud' under the federal
mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (§ 1343), and bank fraud
(§ 1344) statutes."25 The Court concluded that materiality was
indeed an element of all three fraud statutes. 26 The Court's
analysis can be simplified into two steps. First, the Court exam-
ined the text of the statutes,27 and second, the Court utilized the
"well-established rule of construction" of looking to the common
law to find any settled meaning of statutory terms that Congress
may have intended to apply.28
The Neder Court was guided in its standard for analysis by
the precedent set in United States v. Wells.29 Writing for a unani-
mous majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "[u]nder the
framework set forth in United States v. Wells, we first look to the
text of the statutes to discern whether they require a showing of
materiality." 30 The text of the mail fraud statute contains no ex-
22. See United States v. Neder, 136 F.3d 1459,1461-63 (11th Cir. 1998).
23. See id. at 1462-63. See also United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997) (hold-
ing that materiality was not an element of the false statement offense under 18
U.S.C. § 1014). The Court of Appeals in Neder focused on the similarity of the stat-
utes and the fact that neither § 1014, nor § 1344 (or § 1341, or § 1343), included the
term "material" in the text of the statutes. See United States v. Neder, 136 F.3d 1459,
1462-63 (11th Cir. 1998). It therefore concluded that none of the fraud statutes at
issue in Neder included materiality as an element. See id.
24. Neder v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1832 (1999). The Court also granted
certiorari in this case to resolve the issue of "whether, and under what circum-
stances, the omission of an element from the judge's charge to the jury can be harm-
less error." Id. at 1832-33. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text for
explanation of the conflict in the circuit courts.
25. Id. at 1839.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 1840.
29. 519 U.S. 482 (1997).
30. Neder, 119 S.Ct at 1839.
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press materiality element.3' In the Court's dissection of the bank
and wire fraud statutes, it noted that both statutes were modeled
after the mail fraud statute.32 Thus, the Court began its analysis
of all the statutes at issue by seeking the correct method of inter-
pretation for the mail fraud statute, knowing that the wire fraud
and bank fraud statutes would be interpreted in the same man-
ner.33 After examining the express text of the mail fraud statute,
the Court also looked at the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1344,"
and found no materiality element within the express text of the
statute.35 Indeed, none of the statutes at issue in Neder contain
any reference to a materiality element. The Court, therefore,
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). It states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or ar-
tifice to defraud, or for obtaining property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,... for the pur-
poses of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do,
places any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Ser-
vice, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial in-
terstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is di-
rected to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. If the violation affects a financial
institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, was originally
drafted in 1872 and has had only minor amendments since that date. See Brief for
Petitioner at 8, Neder v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (1999) (No. 97-185) [hereinaf-
ter Brief for Petitioner].
32. See Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1839.
33. See id.
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994). It states:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or
artifice -
(1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or
other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a
financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises;
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more
than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
35. See Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1839.
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concluded that "based solely on a 'natural reading of the full text'
. . . materiality would not be an an element of the fraud
statutes."3
6
The accepted method of statutory interpretation, however,
necessitates that a second step follow the natural reading of the
text.37 The established rule of construction dictates that "[w]here
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning
under... the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
other-wise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the
established meaning of these terms." 38 The Court agreed with
Neder's argument that the term "defraud" used in all three fraud
statutes was a term that had accumulated a settled meaning.39
Under the accepted understanding of "defraud" at common law,
materiality was an implied element.40 As a result, the plain text
of the statute, which lacks an explicit materiality element, is
altered by Congress's incorporation of the term "defraud," which
includes a materiality element under common law. The Neder
Court rejected all of the government's arguments countering this
conclusion, and held that,
[U]nder the rule that Congress intends to
incorporate the well-settled meaning of the
common-law terms it uses, we cannot infer from the
absence of an express reference to materiality that
Congress intended to drop that element from the
fraud statutes. On the contrary, we must presume
that Congress intended to incorporate materiality
'unless the statute otherwise dictates.' 41
Because the Court believed that the fraud statutes con-
tained a materiality element, the court of appeals decision was
36. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482,490 (1997)).
37. See id. at 1840.
38. Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,322 (1992)).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,322 (1992)).
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overruled, and the case was remanded to the court of appeals to
decide whether the error in instruction was harmless.42 The re-
mand was heard in December, 1999, and the Eleventh Circuit de-
cided that given the evidence presented at trial, the error was
harmless.43
III. BACKGROUND LAW
Numerous cases contributed to the Neder Court's frame-
work for analysis, historical conceptualization of the issue, and
understanding of the existing precedent in similar fraud cases.
At the time Neder was presented to the Supreme Court, several
circuits had issued conflicting opinions concerning materiality in
bank fraud, wire fraud, and mall fraud statute violations.44 Two
Eleventh Circuit cases had listed the elements of mail fraud (un-
der § 1341) and wire fraud (under § 1343) without including ma-
teriality.4 However, in United States v. Goldsmith,46 the Eleventh
Circuit stated that the second element of bank fraud under § 1344
was "that the defendant participated in the scheme by means of
false pretenses, representations or promises, which were mate-
rial."47 Adding to the circuit court confusion, the Tenth Circuit
stated in United States v. Cochran,48 that, although materiality was
not an element of wire fraud, "there is a materiality aspect to the
determination of whether the acts of an accused give rise to a
42. See id. at 1841.
43. See United States v. Neder, 197 F.3d 1122, 1123 (11th Cir. 1999). The issue
before the Eleventh Circuit on remand was whether the omission of materiality as
an element of bank, mail, and wire fraud was harmless error given the facts of
Neder's case. See id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the omission of materiality was
harmless error. See id. The court held that the misrepresentations made by the de-
fendant in obtaining land acquisition loans and development loans were material.
See id. The error was therefore harmless, and Neder's conviction was affirmed. See
id.
44. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
45. See United States v. Pitt, 717 F.2d 1334,1339 (11th Cir. 1983) (omitting mate-
riality as an element of wire fraud); United States v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340,1343 (11th
Cir. 1983) (failing to list materiality as an element of mail fraud).
46.109 F.3d 714 (11th Cir. 1997).
47. Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
48.109 F.3d 660 (10th Cir. 1997).
2000]
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scheme to defraud." 49
Several Supreme Court cases also addressed fraud and in-
fluenced the interpretation of the mail, wire, and bank fraud
statutes. Durland v. United States 50 was integral in the develop-
ment of the bank fraud statute.5' In Durland, the issue before the
Court was the meaning of the mail fraud statute.52 It was the first
case to interpret the statute, which would later be transformed
into section 1341.53 The controversy in Durland centered on the
breadth of the statute, and specifically, whether the statute in-
cluded representations or promises about the future1 4 The Court
began its analysis by concluding that a "scheme or artifice to de-
fraud" existed, and all of the elements encompassed within this
phrase were satisfied.5 5 The Court then looked at the separate
issues of "intent" and "reliance." 56 The Court held that intent
was an element of the statute, but that reliance was not.57 As a
result, a defendant could violate the statute by intentionally mak-
ing false promises about the future, regardless of whether the in-
tended victim was actually harmed by reliance on the false
promises.58 The Court believed that the purpose of the statute
supported this decision, noting that the statute had a:
purpose of protecting the public against all such in-
tentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post
office from being used to carry them into effect, that
this statute was passed; and it would strip it of
49. Id. at 668 n.3.
50.161 U.S. 306 (1896).
51. See Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1841.
52. See Durland 161 U.S. at 312.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 313
55. See id. It should be noted here that the Court did not discuss what was
needed to satisfy "scheme or artifice to defraud," but rather began its analysis of the
issue by assuming that this term had been satisfied. See id. Thus, the case is not
determinative on whether or not materiality is an element of "scheme or artifice to
defraud." See id. This will be discussed further later in this Note. See infra notes 74-
100 and accompanying text.
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value to confine it to such cases as disclose an actual
misrepresentation as to some existing fact, and ex-
clude those in which is only the allurement of a
specious and glittering promise.59
In making the determination that the statute covered
promises concerning the future, the Court necessarily held that
the statute was broader than the common law definition of the
term "false pretenses." 60 It is important, however, to emphasize
that in its analysis, the Court was holding that the statute was not
adopting the "false pretense" common law requirement of reli-
ance. It did not provide any reason to conclude that materiality
was also not included as an element of the statute. The Court
simply held that the requirements for "scheme or artifice to de-
fraud" had already been met, and did not address whether mate-
riality was an element implied in that phrase.61
In the more recent case of Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company v. Darden,62 the Supreme Court revisited an "estab-
lished" rule for statutory interpretation which required a court to
incorporate the common-law meaning of terms.63 The Court
quoted earlier Supreme Court precedent, stating that, "[w]here
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning un-
der.., the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the estab-
lished meaning of these terms."64 Thus, the Court re-affirmed the
well-established rule of statutory interpretation requiring the as-
sumption that Congress intended to incorporate the common-law
meaning of terms into the statute, even if the text of the statute
does not expressly include all aspects included in the common
59. Id. at 314.
60. See id. at 315.
61. See id.
62. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
63. See id. In Darden, the Court looked to the common-law meaning of the term
"employee," as used in ERISA, which incorporates the common-law and traditional
agency criteria for identifying master-servant relationships. See id.
64. Id. at 322 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730,739-40 (1989)).
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law meaning.
In B.M.W. of North America, Inc. v. Gore,65 the Supreme
Court defined the meaning of the term "fraud" and included ma-
teriality as an element.66 Specifically, the Court stated, "action-
able fraud requires a material misrepresentation or omission." 67
In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 538 as its authority.68
Perhaps the most important Supreme Court case concern-
ing the interpretation of fraud statutes was United States v.
Wells.69 In Wells, the Supreme Court considered whether materi-
ality of falsehood was an element under U.S.C. § 1014, which
prohibits the submission of any false statement to a federally in-
sured financial institution "for the purpose of influencing in any
way" the action of the bank. 70 The Court began by looking to the
text of the statute to determine whether it included a materiality
of falsehood element and noting that the "first criterion in the in-
terpretive hierarchy" was a "natural reading of the full text."71
The text of § 1014, however, contains no reference to material-
ity.72 The Court noted that, "[t]o the contrary, its terms cover
65.517 U.S. 559 (1996).
66 See id. at 579.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 579. See also RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977). The Re-
statement states:
§ 538 Materiality of Misrepresentation
(1) Reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable
unless the matter is material.
(2) The matter is material if
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its exis-
tence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action
in the transaction in question; or
(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason
to know that its recipient regards or is likely to re-
gard the matter as important in determining his
choice of action, although a reasonable man would
not so regard it.
Id.
69. See Neder, 119 S.Ct at 1839; United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997).
70. Wells, 519 U.S. at 490; 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1994). See supra note 70.
71. Wells, 519 U.S. at 490.
72. See id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1994). It states:
[Vol. 4
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'any' false statement that meets the other requirements in the
statute, and the term 'false statement' carries no general sugges-
tion of influential significance." 73 Thus, under the first step in
statutory interpretation, a natural reading of the text, 18 U.S.C. §
1014 contained no materiality of falsehood element.
The Court continued its analysis in Wells by acknowledg-
ing that settled statutory interpretation rules required a second
step. Justice Souter, delivering the majority opinion, wrote, "[w]e
do, of course, presume that Congress incorporates the common-
law meaning of the terms it uses."74 However, in Wells, the de-
fendant failed to present a compelling demonstration that the
term "false statement" included a materiality element at common
law.75 The majority's opinion focused on the fact that §1014 was
a consolidation of 13 earlier statutes, only three of which con-
tained a materiality element.76 The Court reasoned that if Con-
gress had intended to include the materiality element found in
only a few of the earlier statutes, it would have expressly in-
cluded "materiality" within the text of § 1014.77 Congress's fail-
ure to include the materiality element, therefore, must have been
deliberate.78 Thus, the Court in Wells followed the well-
established framework for statutory interpretation and con-
cluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1014 did not contain a materiality of
falsehood element.
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or will-
fully overvalues any land, property or security, for the purpose of
influencing in any way the action of ... any institution the accounts
of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
..., upon any application, advance, discount, purchase, purchase
agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan, or any
change or extension of any of the same, by renewal, deferment of
action or otherwise, or the acceptance, release, or substitution of se-
curity, therefor, shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or impris-
oned not more than 30 years, or both.
Id.
73. Wells, 519 U.S. at 490.
74. Id. at 491 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 492.
77. See id. at 493.
78. See id.
2000] 665
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Law
In Neder v. United States, the Supreme Court considered all
of this background law to reach its decision.79 As stated previ-
ously, the Court used the framework endorsed in both United
States v. Wells and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden
to determine whether materiality was an element of the bank
fraud statute.80 After finding that the plain reading of the text
did not include materiality, the Neder Court inferred that Con-
gress meant to incorporate the common law meaning of "scheme
or artifice to defraud," which includes a materiality element.81
The Court pointed to B.M.W. of North America v. Gore and Re-
statement Second of Torts § 538 as authority for the finding that,
at common law, materiality was an element of "scheme or artifice
to defraud." 82
In the briefs presented by both sides prior to the Supreme
Court's decision, the focus of the arguments was directed at
whether Congress intended to incorporate a materiality element
into the phrase "scheme or artifice to defraud" through accepted
common law meaning, even though Congress failed to include
"materiality" expressly in the text of the statute.83 Both sides ac-
knowledged that a plain reading of the text, the first step in in-
terpretation, did not include materiality as an element.84 Neder,
however, insisted that the common law understanding of
"scheme or artifice to defraud" included materiality.85 The Gov-
ernment raised numerous, arguments in opposition to Neder's
contention.8 6
79. See Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1839-41.
80. See id. at 1839-40.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 1840. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Brief for Petitioner; Brief for Respondent, Neder v. United
States, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999) (No. 97-185) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]; Reply
Brief for Petitioner, Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999) (No. 97-185) [here-
inafter Reply Brief for Petitioner].
84. See Brief for Petitioner, at 31-33; Brief for Respondent, at 36-37.
85. See Brief for Petitioner, at 31-33.
86. See generally Brief for Respondent.
666 [Vol. 4
ELEMENTS OF BANK FRAUD
The Government's central theory was predicated on the
belief that Durland v. United States omitted materiality as an ele-
ment of the mail fraud statute.87 In the respondent's brief, the
Government contended that in Durland, the Supreme Court had
rejected the common law elements of false pretenses, and there-
fore did not incorporate the required reliance or materiality.88
Specifically, the Government argued that in Durland, the Court
held that the statute was prohibiting a "scheme to defraud"
rather than a completed fraud.89 The Government argued that
the elements of reliance and materiality were therefore inconsis-
tent,90 contending that
[t]here is no more reason to impute a materiality
requirement into the phrase "scheme or artifice to
defraud" than there is to impute a requirement of
reliance or damages. As Durland makes clear, the
essence of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud is
the intent to defraud, and a person thus cannot
commit those crimes without at least intending that
his fraudulent scheme cause the victim to part with
money, property, or some other interest. There is
no basis to impose the additional requirement that
the scheme the defendant devised or intended to
devise was objectively material.91
Thus, the Government interpreted Durland as a common
law case that required "intent," but not "materiality." 92 Accord-
ingly, the Government argued that since the attempted fraud did
not have to have been completed or relied upon to satisfy the
statute, the means used should not have to be material.93
87. See id. at 37-38.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 38-40.
91. Id. at 40.
92. See id. at 40-42.
93. See id.
2000] 667
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The Supreme Court, however, stated that "Durland was
different from this case."94 The Neder Court held that the Gov-
ernment's contention that the term "defraud" was broader than
common-law fraud was mistaken.95 In Durland, the Court was
expanding the meaning of "false pretenses" and excluding the
reliance element. 96 The Durland court concluded that the re-
quirements of "false pretenses" could be satisfied without the
fraud being completed.97 Therefore, there was no need for the
elements of reliance or damages, which had previously existed at
common law.98 As the Neder Court recognized, "[b]y prohibiting
the 'scheme to defraud,' rather than the completed fraud, the
elements of reliance and damage would clearly be inconsistent
with the statutes Congress enacted." 99
However, the exclusion of reliance as an element of "false
pretenses" in Durland does not mean that that the mail, wire, and
bank fraud statutes in Neder do not require "materiality." 100 The
Government confused the common law requirements of "false
pretenses" and "defraud."' 101 The common-law understanding of
"defraud" has always included a materiality element.10 2 Al-
though the language of the statutes was inconsistent with "reli-
ance" or "damage" elements, nothing within Durland, or the
language of the fraud statutes at issue in Neder, suggest that ma-
teriality is no longer required.10 3 This conclusion is consistent
with the fact that the elements of "scheme or artifice to defraud"
were presumed to have been satisfied in Durland without a dis-
cussion of what elements were included within this phrase10 4
Thus, the Neder Court concluded that, "while the language of the










104. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 616 (1896).
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fraud statutes is incompatible with these requirements [reliance
and damage], the Government has failed to show that this lan-
guage is inconsistent with a materiality requirement."1
05
B. Policy
Although the legal arguments concerning the bank fraud
statute presented by the United States in Neder were perhaps in-
consistent, the policy favored the government's position, espe-
cially since the aim of the statute was to protect federally insured
financial institutions. 106 Indeed, the Government bolstered its
position with policy arguments and hypotheticals. One such ar-
gument focused on the laws of criminal attempt.107 The Govern-
ment suggested that, as stated in Model Penal Code § 5.01,108
It was no defense to a charge of criminal attempt
that the means the defendant chose... turned out
in the circumstances to be inadequate . . .Nor
should it be a defense to a charge of attempted
fraud that the defendant's deceptive scheme,
though intended to defraud, turned out in the cir-
105. Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1841.
106. See Brief for Respondent, at 43-44.
107. See id. at 40
108. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1998). The Code defines "criminal attempt"
by stating:
(1) Definition of Attempt A person is guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise re-
quired for commission of the crime; he:
(a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the
crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be;
or
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime,
does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with
the belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on
his part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the cir-
cumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission consti-
tuting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to
culminate in his commission of the crime.
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cumstances to be incapable of deceiving, or unim-
portant to, the intended victim.10 9
The Government, during oral arguments and in its brief,
also drew a parallel to a bad actor who intends to commit murder
by the use of poison." 0 One who attempts to murder, yet uses an
ineffective poison, is still guilty of attempted murder."' The
Government must prove that the defendant intended to use effec-
tive means, but the means itself need not be effective." 2 The fact
that the poison was incapable of harming the victim is irrelevant;
only the "intent" to harm is required.113 Thus, one who attempts
to commit bank fraud, yet uses ineffective or immaterial means,
should be convicted under the statute since the defendant would
have satisfied the attempt element." 4
Neder argued that this comparison to criminal attempt
was irrelevant because it misconstrued the common law meaning
of fraud."5 As stated in Neder's reply brief, "[o]ne who intends
to undertake a course of conduct that does not involve a material
falsehood does not intend to 'defraud,' just as one cannot intend
murder without intending to kill the victim."" 6 The Court did
not address the Government's argument comparing the case at
hand to the law of criminal attempt."
7
Also, in its brief, the defense presented the argument that
without the materiality element, the scope of the statute would
become too broad and criminalize innocent conduct." 8 However,
the Government countered that the intent requirement was suffi-
cient to narrow the scope of the statute and protect individuals
109. Brief for Respondent, at 41 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. 3 (c)
(1998)).
110. See id. at 40-41. See also Oral Argument at 43, Neder v. United States, 119 S.
Ct. 1827 (1999) (No. 97-185).




115. Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 16-18.
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from being convicted for innocent behavior.11 9 Specifically, the
Government contended that if the defendant possesses a subjec-
tive intent to commit the fraud, then he or she is a bad actor and
should be punished.120 Further, the Government argued that the
intent of Congress in the construction of section 1344 was to pun-
ish those who threaten the security of federally insured banks.121
In its brief, the Government stated, "[t]o deviate from the statu-
tory text of the mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes by
imposing'additional materiality requirements would therefore
decriminalize a type of wrongdoing that Congress was entitled to
deter and punish through criminal sanctions."122
The Government furthered its policy argument by again
citing Model Penal Code § 5.01.123 The Code notes that a defen-
dant "who tries to commit a crime by what he later learns to be
inadequate methods will recognize the futility of his course of
action and seek more efficacious means."124 In other words, the
purpose of criminalizing unsuccessful attempts, regardless of
whether the means used were material, is to punish bad actors
rather than let them go free to devise more successful schemes.12
Obviously this policy is concerned with protecting banks from
repeated attempts at fraud by bad actors who chose ineffective
means in their prior attempts. Thus, the Government proposed
that no materiality requirement be imposed, stating, "[i]f a mate-
riality requirement would tend to shift the focus from whether
the defendant intended to defraud the victim . . . that conse-
quence is one more reason to reject the imputed materiality ele-
ment as inconsistent with the purposes of the federal fraud
statutes."126
The only other policy arguments which the defendant pre-
sented focused on the requirements of due process and the rule
119. Brief for Respondent, at 43-45.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 44-45.
122. Id. at 45.
123. See id. at 41.
124. Id. at 45 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, n.25 (1998)).
125. See id.
126. Id. at 47.
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of lenity.127 The defendant's due process, it was argued, would
be violated if a materiality element was imposed, because the de-
fendant would have no notice that a materiality element ex-
isted.128 However, the Government argued that the Defendant's
contention that due process requires a materiality element is un-
founded.129 Specifically, the Government argues that since there
is no materiality element listed in the text of the fraud statutes at
issue, there is no reason for anyone to assume any attempted
falsehood must be material to satisfy the statutes.130 As a result,
the defendant's due process rights could not have been violated
because a "reasonable person would certainly have fair notice
that the mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes contain
no mention of materiality."13'
The Rule of Lenity, upon which Neder also relied, has
been said to apply "only if, after seizing everything from which
aid can be derived, [the Court] can make no more than a guess as
to what Congress intended." 32 In such a case, the Rule of Lenity
requires that any doubts are decided in favor of the defendant. 33
However, in the statutes at issue, the Government responded that
there is no ambiguity, and therefore no "guesswork reaching out
for lenity." 34
V. CONCLUSION
The United States crafted several strong policy arguments
for the Supreme Court to consider. Many of these policy argu-
ments focused on the protection of federally insured financial in-
stitutions. Certainly, the intent of Congress in drafting the bank
127. See Brief for Petitioner, at 48-49, Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827
(1999) (No.97-185). The Rule of Lenity is "the familiar rule that where there is ambi-
guity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant." Id. at 49
(quoting Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978)).
128. See id.
129. See Brief for Respondent, at 49.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 49 (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482,499 (1997)).
133. See Brief for Petitioner, at 49.
134. Brief for Respondent, at 49.
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fraud statute was to protect the banking industry from criminals
who may attempt to fraudulently obtain loans or funds. In re-
quiring a materiality element, however, the statute permits bad
actors who chose ineffective means in their attempt to defraud
banks, to escape punishment.135 Thus, these individuals remain
in society, threatening the security of federally insured financial
institutions. Further, the bank fraud statute has not only lost its
ability to punish certain bad acts, but has also had its ability to
deter potential criminal acts undermined. The statute is therefore
left weaker and less capable of achieving the Congressional aim
of protecting federally insured banks.
This Congressional concern is not without merit. A recent
survey by the Federal Reserve concluded that federally insured
banks lost over $500,000,000 in 1997 from check fraud alone.136
This signifies a five percent increase in losses since 1995.137 These
losses cover only check fraud, and do not include the amount
spent by financial institutions to prevent fraud.138 The bank
fraud statute, as well as the Government's policy argument, are
focused on curtailing the increasing bank losses. The Court's de-
cision, however, lessens the effectiveness of the bank fraud stat-
ute and allows bad actors who intended to defraud banks to
remain free.
Although the Government's Brief contained these con-
vincing policy arguments which highlight the need to protect the
banking industry, the Supreme Court's opinion fails to address
these arguments.139 Instead, the Court focuses on strict statutory
interpretation procedures based solely on a plain reading of the
135. Neder's misrepresentations were, in fact, found to be material on remand
and his conviction was therefore affirmed. See United States v. Neder, 197 F.3d
1122 (11th Cir. 1999). However, had his misrepresentations been found to have
been immaterial, Neder would have been found not guilty under the statute even
though a jury had already convicted him. Any attempts at fraudulent activity that
are ineffective and immaterial may now go unpunished, regardless of the intent or
state of mind of the defendant.




139. See generally Neder, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999).
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statute, and the incorporation of any understood common law
meaning of the statutory terms. 40 In using this approach, the
Supreme Court overlooks some of the broad policy concerns
raised by the United States, and maintains that under the prece-
dent set by Wells, the intent of Congress was to incorporate the
common law understanding of the term "defraud." By making
this inference, the Court focuses on the Congressional intent in its
use of the term "defraud." However, in doing so, the Court
seemingly ignores the intent of the entire statute as a whole. Spe-
cifically, nothing in the Neder opinion explains how the statutory
goal of protecting federally insured financial institutions, and
punishing criminals who attempt to defraud these banks, are
served by the Court's decision.
The Supreme Court followed the well-established method
of statutory interpretation set forth in Wells and other cases. It
considered the language of §1344, as well as existing precedent
which dealt with § 1344, and reached a decision consistent with
the strict letter of the law. However, by requiring a materiality of
falsehood element for § 1344, the Supreme Court may be jeopard-
izing the security of the nation's banking industry. Rather than
punishing inept bad actors, the statute now allows individuals
who chose ineffective means to defraud banks to craft better
means and try again.
JOHN S. SLOSSON
140. See id.
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